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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
of the public, the only conclusion is that in no case (but perhaps
that of prepayment) is the utility actually possessed of "unregu-
lated managerial discretion" in the making of its rules. Even
the smoking and "move forward in the car" regulations of a
street car company are subject to the full control of the commis-
sion. 139 As a result the inevitable conclusion is that there is no
true field of unregulated "self-regulation"-as was said by the
Missouri Supreme Court in a somewhat recent case, in speaking
of the powers of the state commission, it possesses "plenary super-
vision of every business feature."140
SIDNEY J. MURPHY, '34.
THE MODERN INNKEEPER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
TO THE PERSON OF HIS GUEST
In the busy and complex social and business life of today the
innkeeper plays an important part. It is his function to furnish
a place of temporary abode to our vast transient population, and
entertainment to travellers and others. His place of business
may be in the small structure which the village calls "hotel" or in
one of the enormously costly plants which go under the same
generic name in our large cities and which cater to the guest's
every whim. His business has developed from the isolated inns
of feudal times into an enterprise which in 1928 ranked ninth
among the great industries of the United States. In that year
there were in the United States nearly twenty-six thousand
hotels, representing an investment of over five billion dollars,
employing over a half-million people, and supplying service and
accommodations to millions of people yearly.'
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the modern law as it
relates to the innkeeper's liability for the personal injuries or
death of his guest, while the guest is infra hospitum, that is,
within the precincts of the inn and under the innkeeper's care.2
Or, viewed conversely, it is the purpose of this paper to discover
what degree of protection is afforded to the guest by the law as it
has been developed by decisions or changed by statute. Because
of the very nature of the topic, the paper will largely resolve it-
self into a survey of the pertinent law as it is in the United States
today. But when the occasion offers the opportunity, a critical
139 See West End Business Men's Ass'n v. United Ry. Co. of St. Louis(1915) P. U. R. 1915 D, 482; Coombs v. So. Wis. Ry. Co. (1916) 162 Wis.
111, 155 N. W. 922.
140 State v. Kansas City Gas Co. (1913) 254 Mo. 515, 163 S. W. 854.
1 The Official Hotel Red Book (1928).
2 Davidson v. Madison Corporation (1932) 247 N. Y. S. 789.
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analysis of the material will be attempted and here and there,
perhaps, a suggestion made as to desirable changes in the law.
At this point, it may not be amiss to remark parenthetically
that a discussion of the modern innkeeper's liability is of more
than merely academic interest. One illustration of its practical
possibilities should suffice to prove that statement.
"Last week in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion a committee of experts on sanitation and tropical dis-
eases . . . reported its recent investiagtions in Chicago.
The experts laid blame for the epidemic (of amoebic dysen-
tery which has spread throughout the country) on an Act of
God and defective plumbing in the two hotels which were the
chief sources of the infection. The committee clemently re-
ferred to the hotels as C and A, but everyone knew it meant
South Michigan Boulevard's big, popular Congress and its
smaller neighbor, the Auditorium.
"The committee found the hotel's water and sewerage pip-
ing systems so old and faulty that when heavily taxed they
would let waste from bathtubs and toilets siphon back into
drinking water pipes. Water and sewer pipes were cross-
connected ... "3
41 deaths and 721 cases of amoebic dysentery have been traced to
Chicago. It is conceivable, indeed, it is highly probable, that
many actions for damages will be brought against the offending
hotels by the injured parties or the representatives of their es-
tates.
This discussion will be divided into four general parts. First,
the innkeeper's liability for assaults committed upon his guest.
Second, his liability for injuries suffered by the guest by reason of
defective premises. Third, his liability for serving unwholesome
food or for permitting the hotel premises to remain in an unsani-
tary condition. And, fourth, his liability for the injuries or
deaths of his guests caused by fire.
But before going farther, it may be well to define our terms.
"An inn is a house which is held out to the public as a place
where all transient persons who come will be received and en-
tertained as guests for compensation."' 4
"An innkeeper is a person who publicly professes that he
keeps an inn." 5
3Time Newsmagazine, February 12, 1934, p. 45.
4 Pettit v. Thomas (1912) 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501; Fay v. Pacific Im-
provement Co. (1891) 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099; State v. Norval Hotel Co.
(Ohio 1921) 133 N. E. 75; St. Louis v. Siegrist (1870) 46 Mo. 593; 32 C. J.
527.5Roberts v. Case Hotel (1919) 175 N. Y. S. 123; Pettit v. Thomas, note 4,
above; State v. Norval Hotel Co., note 4, above; 32 C. J. 529.
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"A guest, within the meaning of the rules of law pertaining
to the relation of innkeeper and guest and as distinguished
from a person received and entertained without pay at the
private house of another, is a transient person who resorts
to, and is received at, an inn for the purpose of obtaining the
accommodations which it purports to afford." G
I. LIABILITY FOR ASSAULTS COMMITTED UPON THE GUEST
At early Common Law, the innkeeper had no special duty to
protect his guest's person. "If the guest be beaten in the inn,
the innkeeper shall not answer for it."'7 This apparently is still
the law in many American jurisdictions. This is illustrated by
the famous Clancy v. Barker case which arose in the Federal
Courts.8 In a suit by a father for the injury suffered by his
son at the hands of the defendant innkeeper's servant (a bell-
hop), the court in denying recovery said, that an innkeeper is
not an insurer of the safety of the person of his guest while the
latter remains in the hotel against the negligent and willful acts
of his servants, when they are acting without the course and
without the actual or apparent scope of their employment. It
was said that the obligation of the innkeeper is limited to the
exercise of reasonable care for the safety, comfort and entertain-
ment of his visitor; that only ordinary care is required, because
the innkeeper's occupation is not fraught with danger, as is, for
instance, that of a common carrier. In this court's opinion, the
guest is in much the same position as an invitee; and the inn-
keeper is responsible for his servant's acts only on the general
doctrine of respondeat superior.9 And, further, the court is
very stringent in determining what is within the course of the
servants' employment. As are also the cases cited in the footnote
as in accord. 9
On the other side of the picture is the Clancy vi. Barker case
which was decided in the Nebraska courts.' 0 This suit arose on
the same facts as the federal case, it being brought however in
the name of the injured boy. The Nebraska Supreme Court held,
-that the defendant was liable, for breach of an implied contract
to protect his guest. The court likened the relations between
innkeeper and guest to those between carrier and passenger, 1
6 De Lapp v. Van Closter (1909) 136 Mo. App. 475, 118 S. W. 120; Over-
street v. Moser (1901) 88 Mo. App. 72; 32 C. J. 533.
7 Calye's Case (1584) 4 Coke 202.
8 (1904) 31 F. 161.
9 Accord: Rahmed v. Lehndorff (1904) 142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659; Chase v.
Nobel (1907) 46 Wash. 484, 90 Pac. 642; Hook v. Sanford (1923) 29 Ga. App.,
116 S. E. 221; Buckleyv. Edgewater Beach Hotel Co. (1928) 247 Ill. App. 362.
10 (1904) 71 Neb. 83, 98 N. W. 440.
"1 Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Flexman (1885) 19 Ill. App. 250 holds that a
carrier is liable for all torts of its servants committed against a passenger
during carriage on an implied contract theory.
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saying that by analogy, the innkeeper's contract imposes a like
duty upon him to protect his guest. The analogy perhaps will
not support the court's result, inasmuch as the peculiar condi-
tions which place the passenger at the mercy of the carrier's
servants do not exist in a hotel, which, obviously, is permanently
placed rather than fast moving, and does not have the dangers
attendant to extremely fast locomotion. This in fact was the
Federal court's ground for not following the Nebraska decision.
However, the analogy is close enough, it is submitted, to justify
the decision. Realistically considered, the relation of innkeeper
and guest does place the guest peculiarly within the mercy of the
innkeeper and his servants. The guest is usually a stranger in
the hotel, and, within limits, must accept whatever accommoda-
tions the innkeeper provides. The innkeeper employs servants
to help provide the accommodations and to minister to the guest's
needs. These servants are within the innkeeper's choosing; and
he should be responsible for their acts if they injure a guest. The
Nebraska decision seems to be in accord with the trend of the
modern cases, which require a very high degree of care on the
part of the innkeeper to protect guests against the assaults, in-
sults, and negligent acts of servants, and which make free use
of the analogy to the common carrier. 12
But where a guest is injured by another guest, the few reported
cases all agree in absolving the innkeeper of liability, unless he
knew or should have known that the offending guest would, or
probably would, act to the injury of another guest, and took no
steps to prevent such action. 13 Such a result is in accordance
with reason, inasmuch as the act of an independent third party,
not within the innkeeper's control except to a slight extent, is
involved. However, where the innkeeper operates a bar, it has
been held that he owes a patron the duty to exercise ordinary
care to protect him from an assault and battery by another patron,
and is liable for an assault and battery, if, by the exercise of
ordinary care he could have prevented the same.14 This result
is not out of line with the former result, if we take into con-
sideration the fact that in operating a bar, an innkeeper dispenses
to his patrons spiritous liquors, which easily inflame the passions.
In close relation to the cases of assault by a servant are those
cases involving a wrongful entry into the guest's room by the inn-
keeper or his servants. A guest is entitled to the privacy of the
12 Lehnen v. Hones (Kan. 1912) 127 Pac. 612; Overstreet v. Moser, note 6,
above; Norris Hotel Co. v. Henley (1900) 145 Ala. 678, 40 So. 81; Tyler v.
Phil. Ritz-Carleton Co. (1920) 73 Pa. Sup. Ct. 427: Mayo Hotel Co. v. Dan-
cigar (Okla. 1930) 288 Pac. 309; Note (1904) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 575.13 Rommel v. Schambacher (1887) 120 Pa. St. 579, 11 Atl. 779; Bruner v.
Seebacher Hotel Co. (1909) 133 Ky. 41, 117 S. W. 373; Gurren v. Casperson
(1928) 147 Wash. 257, 265 Pac. 472.
1, Moon v. Condey (1918) 9 Ohio App. 16.
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room to which he has been assigned, and to remain there un-
molested by improper or unjustified and unreasonable intrusions
on the part of the hotel keeper or those acting under his author-
ity.15 "One of the things which a guest has a right to insist upon
is respectful and decent treatment at the hands of the innkeeper
and his servants. That is an essential part of the contract
whether it is express or implied." 16 This right of a guest neces-
sarily implies an obligation on the part of the innkeeper not to
abuse or insult the guest.17 Or, as was said in the Massachusetts
case of Frewen v. Page,'8 generally, an innkeeper is liable if he,
without sufficient cause, interferes with the peace and quiet en-joyment of the guests of the hotel, the rule being based on an im-
plied obligation of the hotel keeper to furnish his guests with
such conveniences and comforts as the inn affords. That the ob-
ligation of the innkeeper is implied out of his contract with the
guest seems to be the general rule.' 9 However, a Missouri case
declares that the duty of an innkeeper to keep his guest safe is
one imposed by law and not by contract (so that an action against
the innkeeper did not survive against the estate of the inn-
keeper) .20
Further, it has been held, in a case where the obligation of the
innkeeper was said to rest upon contract, that registration is not
essential to the contract, that the contract may be a mere matter
of oral consent and is legal without further formality, and that
the obligation of the innkeeper not to insult the guest arises out
of such an oral contract.21 As may have been inferred from the
rule as stated in Frewen v. Page the innkeeper may enter the
guest's room if he has probable cause for so doing. As in the
case of Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co.,22 where the guest who later be-
came the plaintiff had registered at the hotel before her husband,
who registered later. The husband got a different room, with-
out disclosing to the innkeeper that he was the plaintiff's husband.
When the plaintiff invited her husband into her room, the inn-
keeper, suspecting prostitution, forcibly entered the room, and
ejected the couple. A verdict for the plaintiff was reversed, on
15 Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett (1921) 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S. E. 309.18 Dixon v. Tutweiler Operating Co. (Ala. 1926) 108 So. 26.
17 Idem.
is Frewen v. Page (1921) 238 Mass. 499, 131 N. E. 475.
19 Mloody v. Kenny (1923) 153 La. 1007, 97 So. 21; Fisher v. Booneville
(1920) 55 Utah 588, 188 Pac. 156; Hurd v. Hotel Astor (1918) 169 N. Y. S.
359, 182 App. Div. 49; Arky v. Leitch (1923) 131 Miss. 14, 94 So. 855; Jones
v. Shannon (1918) 55 Mont. 225, 175 Pac. 882, Kalo & Sullivan v. Penn Hotel
Co. (1927) 82 Pa. Sup. Ct. 259; Stevenson v. Grier Hotel Co. (1923) 159
Ark. 44, 251 S. W. 355; and cases cited in notes 14 to 17 inclusive.
20 Stanley v. Bircher (1883) 78 Mo. 245.
21 Moody v. Kenny, note 19, above; Fisher v. Booneville, note 19, above.22 Note 19, above.
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the ground that it was against the weight of the evidence which
clearly showed probable cause.
When the innkeeper violates his obligation to the guest, and
invades her room, and orders her to leave the hotel, assaulting,
falsely imprisoning, and slandering her, damages may be assessed
for humiliation of the guest's feelings as well as for the unwar-
ranted disturbance of her right of privacy, where such acts were
not justified.23 As the innkeeper's obligation was based upon
contract, such a holding seems to be correct, inasmuch as the con-
tract must be taken to include an agreement on the innkeeper's
part not to injure the guest in her feelings, since his obligation
is not to abuse or insult her. In the Arkansas case of Steven-
son v. John J. Grier Hotel Co.24 a complaint was held not to be
demurrable, where it alleged only mental suffering without physi-
cal injury, since there was "constructive physical injury" in the
actual coercion of the plaintiff, who was held not to be required
to continue protesting until constructive coercion or force became
actual. As is apparent from what has been said, the cases are
strict in holding the innkeeper to his obligation not to disturb
the guest's privacy. The Missouri case of Dalzell v. Dean Hotel
Co.,25 declares that the innkeeper, while not an insurer of the per-
sonal safety, and privacy, of the guest, owes her a very high de-
gree of care-this holding is similar to that in the Nebraska
Clancy v. Barker case. And the innkeeper is not excused of a
wrongful entry into a guest's room because he drew a wrong
inference as to the guest's sex from the signature on the register. 26
This would seem to require a high degree of care, as no jury could
reasonably find that an ordinary man could remember the sex of
every signer of the register of a large hotel.
II. LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO GUESTS CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE
PREMISES.
The cases unite in saying that an innkeeper is not an insurer
of the safety of his guest. 21 But they all say that he must use
23 Frewen v. Page, note 18, above; Emmke v. De Silva (C. C. A. 8th 1923)
293 F. 17.
24 Note 19, above.
25 (1916) 193 Mo. App. 379.
26 Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, note 15, above.
27 Scholl v. Belcher (1912) 63 Ore. 310, 127 Pac. 968; Dye-Washburn
Hotel Co. v. Aldridge (1922) 207 Ala. 471, 93 So. 512; Reid v. Ehr (1919) 43
N. D. 109, 174 N. W. 71; Tamres v. Reed (Pa. 1933) 165 AtI. 538; Patrick
v. Springs (1911) 154 N. C. 270, 70 S. E. 395; Walker v. Midland R. Co.
(1887) 55 L. T. N. S. 489; Morris v. Zimmerman (1900) 122 N. Y. S. 900;
Trulock v. Willey (C. C. A. 8th 1911) 187 F. 956; Rice v. Warner Hotel Co.(1916) 201 Ill. App. 530; Lyttle v. Denny (1909) 22 Pa. St. 395; Burgauer v.
McClellan (1924) 205 Ky. 51, 265 S. W. 439; Thomas v. Wolcott (1920) 180
N. Y. S. 798; Halterman v. Hansard (1915) 4 Ohio App. 268; Polsey v. Wal-
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care to keep his buildings and premises safe for the use of his
guests, only differing on the degree of care that the innkeeper
must exercise. Some few cases are in accord with the Oregon
case of Scholl v. Belcher, in saying that it is the "duty of an inn-
keeper to take ordinary care to keep his buildings and premises
reasonably safe for the use of his guests." 28 But the trend of the
cases seems to be with Trulock v. Willey,29 a Federal case, in
which it was said:
"A guest in a hotel is there on the invitation of the proprietor
and for the proprietor's profit; and while he ought not, and
cannot be said, to be an insurer of the safety of the person of
his guest while within the hotel, yet the guest is received upon
the implied understanding that while on the premises as a
guest his life shall not be endangered by the rash, incon-
siderate, and negligent acts of the proprietor or those who
are his servants. By the implied contract between a hotel
keeper and his guest, the former undertakes not only to fur-
nish the latter with suitable food and lodgings, but there is
also implied upon the part of the proprietor the further un-
dertaking that the guest shall be treated with due consider-
ation for his safety. The relation existing between an inn-
keeper and his guest is much like that existing between a
common carrier and its passenger, and, while not an insurer
of the personal safety of his guest, the proprietor is held, and
ought to be held, to the exercise of a very high degree of care
for the protection of his guests against the negligent acts of
servants employed therein."
Where the guest is injured because of a defect in the hotel
premises, it is pretty generally held that the doctrine res ipsa
loquitur applies.30  In the North Carolina case of Patrick v.
Springs, Brown, J., said:
"It seems now to be well settled that, in case of an injury
occurring in consequence of the unsanitary and defective
condition of the inn premises or room to which the guest is
dorf-Astoria (1927) 220 App. Div. 613, 222 N. Y. S. 273; Burnison v. Souders(Mo. 1931) 35 S. W. (2d) 619; Topleyv. Zeeman (Cal. App. 1932) 5 Pac. (2d)
561.
28 Scholl v. Belcher, note 27, above; Reid v. Ehr, note 27, above; Lyttle v.
Denny, note 27, above; Rice v. Warner Hotel Co., note 27, above; Burgauer
v. McClellan, note 27, above.
29 Trulock v. Willey, note 27, above; Morris v. Zimmerman, note 27, above;
Hasson v. Wood 22 Ont. Rep. 66; Axford v. Prior, 14 Week. Rep. 611; Pat-
rick v. Springs, note 27, above; Tamres v. Reed, note 27, above; Thomas v.
Wollcott, note 27, above; Halterman v. Hansard, note 27, above.
8o Patrick v. Springs, note 27, above; Trulock v. Willey, note 27, above;
Morris v. Zimmerman, note 27, above; Tamres v. Reed, note 27, above.
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assigned, the innkeeper is liable upon the same principles
applicable in other cases, where persons come on the prem-
ises at the invitation of the owner or occupant, and are in-
jured in consequence of their dangerous condition. The inn-
keeper is not an insurer of his guests' personal safety, but
his liability does extend to injuries received by the guests
from being placed in an unsafe room. This is a matter pe-
culiarly within the innkeeper's knowledge and entirely be-
yond the control of the guest. In that particular he is pe-
culiarly within the innkeeper's power and protection ...
One who keeps a public house extends an invitation to'all to
come on his premises, and is, therefore, liable for injuries
sustained in consequence of the bad condition of his inn
premises. . . . When the plaintiff proved the unsafe and
defective condition of the gas fixtures in consequence of which
gas escaped during the night and injured him, he made out a
prima facie case of negligence, which it was the defendant's
duty to answer."
And in Morris v. Zimmerman, where the plaintiff was injured
when a large piece of plaster fell from the ceiling of his room and
struck him on the head, there being no evidence as to what caused
the fall of the plaster, the court said:
"Plaster does not fall ordinarily from properly constructed
ceilings, unless the ceiling is out of repair, or there is some
adequate external cause. If there was an external cause in
this case, the fair inference is that the defenadants were re-
sponsible for it, and they have it in their power to explain it.
If the accident was due to the defective condition of the ceil-
ing, the defendants in the exercise of that watchfulness
which an innkeeper owes to his guest should have discovered
it. The plaintiff only knows that he was hurt by a fall of the
plaster. I can see no distinction between the fall of plaster
upon a guest in a hotel and the fall of a wall upon a pedes-
trian in the street. . . . Both occurrences point to negli-
gence, to a defective condition which the defendants, in the
exercise of the care which they owed to the plaintiff, could
have discovered or to some external cause within the defend-
ants' control. Under such circumstances, the rule applies,
and the burden is cast upon the party having it within his
power, to explain the accident."
Upon the innkeeper's duty to keep the inn premises in a safe and
sanitary condition, there is, however, this limitation:
"The general duty of an innkeeper to take proper care for
the safety of his guest does not extend to every room in his
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss3/5
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house at all hours of the night or day, but must be limited to
those places into which guests may be reasonably supposed
to be likely to go in a reasonable belief that they are entitled
or invited to do so."'31
Nor does the innkeeper owe any special care to a person going to
the room of a guest, upon the latter's invitation, for the purpose
of gambling, or for some other improper motive, except not wil-
fully or intentionally to injure him, i. e., the guest's guest in such
case is a bare licensee.81 Incidentally, where a guest goes to a
hotel for an immoral purpose, viz., sexual intercourse with a pros-
titute, if has been held that he does not become a guest in a legal
sense, and is not entitled to protection as a guest, in regard to re-
covering money left with the clerk for safe-keeping but stolen
from the clerk during the night, the court asking,
"Is the extraordinary rule of liability which was originally
adopted from considerations of public policy to protect travel-
lers and wayfarers, not merely from negligence, but the dis-
honesty of innkeepers and servants, to be extended to such
persons? If so, why not to thieves?8 3
(This last case may be out of place here inasmuch as it involves
liability for loss of property; but, since it deals with improper
motives of the guest in going to the hotel, the writer thought it in
point.) It is submitted that the guest's improper motive should
not relieve the innkeeper from liability for injury to the guest's
person or property. Making an exception in such instance does
violence to the rule, without sufficient cause for so doing. The
innkeeper may protect himself from sheltering wrongdoers by
the simple process of ejecting them. If he does not choose to
eject them, there is not reason for freeing him of liability when
their persons or property are injured.
In regard to certain portions of the hotel premises, the care
required of the innkeeper differs. This is particularly true of
elevators. The Florida case of Haile v. Mason Hotel & Invest-
ment Co.34 is the only case found which required only ordinary
care-in this instance, ordinary care in providing a safe exit from
the elevator. The decided weight of authority is to require "ex-
traordinary diligence,"3 or "the highest degree of care that is
31 Ten Broeck v. Wells (C. C., N. D. Cal. 1891) 47 F. 690. Accord:
Walker v. Midland R. Co., note 27, above; Lander v. Brooks (Mass. 1926) 154
N. E. 265; McAlpin v. Powell (1877) 70 N. Y. 126.
82 Jones v. Bland (1921) 182 N. C. 70, 108 S. E. 344.
88 Curtis v. Murphy (1885) 63 Wis. 4,22 N. W. 825.
0 Haile v. Mason Hotel Co. (1916) 71 Fla. 469, 71 So. 540.
35 Bullard v. Rolader (1921) 26 Ga. App. 742, 107 So. 548; Manzy v. Kinzel(1886) 19 Ill. App. 571.
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consistent with the efficient use of the means and appliances
adopted," 36 which is the same care and diligence as a railroad is
required to use for the safety of its passengers.3 7 And the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies.38 In Stott v. Churchill,39
a New York case, in referring to the innkeeper's duty to provide
a safe elevator, if he provides one at all, the court said:
"A personal duty cannot be delegated to another so as to re-
lieve the person bound to perform the duty from liability for
its nonperformance."
This was said in answer to the defendant's claim that the plain-
tiff's injury was due to the fault of an independent contractor in
installing the elevator. The cases are in accord that the inn-
keeper's duty in regard to elevators cannot be delegated, 40 Burr v.
Curtis saying that so far as passengers are concerned, a carrier
is responsible for the negligence of the manufacturer of the ve-
hicle used for the transportation.40 The basis of this case was
clearly an analogy to the common carrier's duty towards its
passengers.
And there are quite a number of cases involving injuries sus-
tained by guests in falling down hotel stairways. It seems to
be the general rule that it is the duty of the innkeeper to his guests
to have and maintain his premises in a condition of reasonable
safety, that is, he must exercise ordinary care.41 This rule as to
premises includes stairways.42 Whether or not the innkeeper
used ordinary care is, of course, a question for the jury.43 And
it has been held, that the absence of handrails from an ordinary
interior stairway, walled on both sides, is not actionable negli-
gence.4 4 But it is the duty of the innkeeper to have a flight of
3 Fraser v. Harper House Co. (1908) 141 Ill. App. 390.
37 Fraser v. Harper House Co., note 36, above; McDowell v. Rickey (1929)
32 Ohio App. 26; Gardner v. Newhouse Realty Co. (Utah 1928) 267 Pac. 186.
38 Bullard v. Rolader, note 35, above.
39 (1895) 157 N. Y. 692, 51 N. E. 1094; Sciolara v. Asch (1910) 198 N. Y.
77, 91 N. E. 263.
40 Sciolara v. Asch, note 39, above; Storr v. Churchill (1895) 15 Misc. Rep.
80,36 N. Y. S. 476; Manzy v. Kinzel, note 35, above; McLenan v. Segar (1917)
2 K. B. 325; Burr v. Curtis (1922) 151 Minn. 200, 186 N. W. 302; Barker v.
Pollock (1906) 4 West. L. R. 327.
41 West v. Thomas (1892) 97 Ala. 622, 11 So. 768.
42 Robertson v. Weingart (Cal. 1928) 267 Pac. 741; Armstrong v. Yakima
Hotel Co. (1913) 75 Wash. 477, 135 Pac. 233; Braman v. Stewart (1906) 145
Mich. 548, 108 N. W. 964; Willimaa v. Maki (Minn. 1925) 204 N. W. 25;
Cook v. McGihlicudy (1909) 106 Me. 119, 175 AtI. 378; Ferguson v. Sturch
(1915) 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 516.
48 Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel Co., note 42, above; Braman v. Stewart,
note 42, above.
'4 Willimaa v. Maki, note 42, above; Cook v. McGillicudy, note 42, above.
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stairs lighted.4 5 However, if the lights in a stairway are put out
by someone without the innkeeper's, or his servants', knowledge,
there is no liability for an injury to a guest due to lack of light on
the stairway.46 Such a holding is based upon the theory that the
innkeeper used the care that an ordinary person would use. How-
ever, due to the nature of an inn, and due to the fact that most
guests are strangers and are unacquainted with the inn premises,
it is submitted that the innkeeper should be compelled to keep the
stairways well lighted at his peril. But no cases have been found
so holding, the courts, rather, being prone to find a guest guilty
of contributory negligence if he uses a dark stairway.47 But,
justly, if there is no other way for the guest to reach the ground
floor except by using a darkened stairway, it has been held that
he does not assume the risk of injury in attempting to reach the
ground floor by using such stairway.48 One of the cases so hold-
ing, Ritter v. Norman,4 9 apparently might sustain the contention
made above, that the innkeeper should be bound at his peril to
keep the stairways lighted. It was said in that case:
"A guest in a hotel has a right to depend upon a stairway, and
the fact that it is open and stands as an invitation at all
times, and especially when the elevator, if there is one, is out
of use, puts the burden upon the innkeeper to put the means
he has provided for the safety of his guests into operation."
HI. LIABILITY FOR SERVING UNWHOLESbME FOOD OR FOR PERMITTING
THE HOTEL PREMISES TO REMAIN IN AN UNSANITARY CONDITION
The inn must be kept in a sanitary condition. Where a guest
had smallpox, an innkeeper was held liable to another guest who
was exposed to it and contracted it, the guest who contracted it
not having been informed of the presence of the disease.50 And
unsanitary conditions caused by flies in the dining room justify
a guest in committing a breach of contract to stay for a certain
time.51 But the innkeeper is not liable for a physician's negli-
gence in treating a guest, since the negligence is that of a third
45 Thomas v. Walcott, note 27, above; Hendrick v. Jones (1922) 28 Ga. App.
335, 111 S. E. 81.46 Ferguson v. Sturch, note 42, above.4 7 De Honey v. Harding (C. C. A., 8th 1926) 300 F. 696; Baker v. Butter-
worth (Va. 1916) 89 S. E. 849; Sneed v. Moorehead (1893) 70 Miss. 690, 13
So. 235; Cook v. McGilicudy, note 42, above; Thomas v. Walcott, note 27,
above; Hendrick v. Jones, note 45, above; Castleberry v. Fox (1922) 29 Ga.
App. 35; 113 S. E. 110.
48Ritter v. Norman (Wash. 1913) 129 Pac. 103; Marmeduke v. Cook
(1891) 154 Mass. 235, 28 N. E. 140.
49 Note 48, above.
so Gilbert v. Hoffman (1895) 66 Ia. 205, 23 N. W. 632.
51 Williams v. Sneed (1920) 119 Me. 228, 110 Atl. 316.
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party not under the innkeeper's control (the court also gives as a
reason, that the innkeeper is not an insurer of a guest's safety-
this seems to be out of point).52 And where a guest sustained
burns to his knees from chemicals used in spraying beds, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained a decision finding for the
plaintiff, the spray being the proximate cause of the injury.53
In many states it is provided by statute that the hotel shall be
kept in a sanitary condition, the statute usually dealing with
specific matters, such as clean bedding, towels, screened windows,
etc. 54 These statutes provide that for any violation of them, the
innkeeper shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. But as the statutes
are intended for the benefit of the guest, civil liability would
probably be imposed upon the innkeeper for an injury resulting
from their violation. (This point will be discussed later in refer-
ence to fire escapes, where the cases will be cited.)
The cases conflict on the point of the innkeeper's liability for
injuries suffered by his guests in eating spoiled food in a restau-
rant attached to the inn. It was declared in an early English
case arguendo, that "if a man sell victuals which is corrupt,
without warranty, an action lies, because it is against the com-
monwealth." 55 An Illinois case, Greenwood v. Thompson, pro-
ceeds upon the same ground, saying that the law imposes upon a
restaurant keeper an implied warranty that the food he serves
and sells to his patrons is wholesome and fit to be eaten, and he
will be held liable if it proves otherwise, whether he was negligent
or not.56  This case represents the weight of authority. One of
the cases in accord with it says that the furnishing of provisions
which endanger human life or health stands clearly upon the same
ground as the administering of improper medicine, from which
a liability springs irrespective of any question of privity of con-
52 Barry v. Merriman (1926) 215 App. Div. 294, 214 N. Y. S. 66.
53 Nelson v. Ritz-Carleton Hotel Co. (1931) 9 N. J. Misc. 1240.
54Code Ala., 1923, sec. 4465; Dig. Stat. Ark., 1921, sees. 5559 to 5563; Gen.
Laws Cal., 1931, Act 3442; Comp. Gen. Laws Fla., 1927, secs. 3360 to 3385;
Burn's Anno. Ind. Stat., 1926, sees. 8726, 8727; R. S. Kan., 1923, sees. 36-107;
R. C. Mont., 1921, sees. 2485 to 2502; Comp. Stat. Neb., 1922, sec. 7552; N. C.
Code, sec. 2283 plus; Page's Anno. Ohio Gen. Code, 1926, see. 4665; Okla. Stat.,
1931, see. 4527; R. C. Ariz., 1928, see. 2691; Idaho Comp. Stat., 1919, sees.
1799 to 1809; La. Gen. Stat., 1932, sees. 3816 to 3822; Nev. Comp. Laws, 1929,
sees. 3337 to 3348; Comp. Laws N. D., 1913-1925 Supplement; Comp. Laws
S. D., 1929, sec. 7837; Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, sees. 2945 to 2953. In some
of the remaining states, provisions for sanitary conditions may be found
under "Health Regulations" in the statutes.
55 Roswel v. Vaugh, Cro. Jac. 196.
56 (1919) 213 Ill. App. 371. Accord: Heise v. Gillette (1925) 83 Ind. App.
551, 149 N. E. 182; Smith v. Carols (1923) 215 Mo. App. 488, 249 S. W. 155;
Temple v. Keeler (1924) 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635; Doyle v. Fuerst &
Kramer, Ltd. (1911) 129 La. 838; 56 So. 906; Bishop v. Weber (1885) 139
Mass. 411, 1 N. E. 154.
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tract between the parties. 7 And it is not necessary for the guest
who was made sick by eating unwholesome food served by the
innkeeper to prove that the defendant knew of the injurious qual-
ity of the food, if it appear that he ought to have known.58
The New York courts apparently limit the innkeeper's im-
plied warranty of fitness to instances where the food is prepared
by him (or by his servants, of course).59 This seems to be a
desirable limitation. The rule is harsh which fastens liability
upon the innkeeper for injuries caused to his guest by defects in
food not apparent to the senses, where canned foods of good
quality are served. Only one case denies recovery to the injured
guest. There it is said that in the absence of statute, a restaurant
keeper is not liable on the ground of an implied warranty of fit-
ness of the food furnished by him. 6o In the states which have
adopted the Uniform Sales Act (Missouri has not adopted it),
section 15 of that act would of course be applicable here. That
section provides, that where the seller (restaurant keeper or inn-
keeper, here) knows the purpose (consumption) for which the
buyer wants the object of the sale (food), there is an implied
warranty of fitness for that purpose.
IV. LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO GUESTS CAUSED BY FIRE
The innkeeper's obligation to protect his guest infra hospitum
from fire is of modern origin. The duty to provide fire escapes
for buildings properly constructed and not peculiarly exposed to
danger of fire from the character of the work to be carried on
therein did not exist at common law.6 1 Accordingly, at common
law there was no obligation to provide fire escapes on properly
constructed inns for the safety of the guests or lodgers.0 2 But
statutes imposing such duty have been passed in most of the
states.63 The constitutionality of such statutes has been sus-
57 Bishop v. Weber, note 56, above.
58 Idem.59 Barrington v. Hotel Astor (1918) 184 App. Div. 317, 171 N. Y. S. 840.60 Loucks v. Morley (1919) 39 Cal. App. 570, 179 Pac. 529.
61 Panley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. (1892) 131 N. Y. 90, 29 N. E. 999;
Jones v. Granite Mills (1878) 126 Mass. 84.6 2 Yall v. Snow (1907) 201 Mo. 511, 100 S. W. 1; Johnson v. Snow (1903)
102 Mo. App. 233, 76 S. W. 675; Schmalzried v. White (1896) 97 Tenn. 36,
36 S. W. 393.
63 Code Ala., 1923, sees. 4048, 4049; Dig. Stat. Ark., 1921, sec. 5562; Gen.
Stat. Conn., 1930, sees. 2613, 2614, 2615; Comp. Law. Colo., 1921, sees. 5473,
5474, 5472; Comp. Gen. Laws Fla., 1927, sec. 3370; Ga. Code, 1926, sec. 1770
(83), 501 (1); Cahill's Ill. R. S., 1929, Ch. 71, par. 10; Burn's Anno. Ind.
Stat., 1926, sec. 4422; Carroll's Ky. Stat., 1930, sec. 2095a; R. S. Kans., 1923,
sees. 36-107; Comp. Law Mich., 1929, see. 2737; Gen. Stat. Minn., 1923, sees.
5896, 5897, 5910, 6016; R. C. Mont., 1921, sees. 2779 to 2784; R. S. Mo., 1929,
sees. 13096,13097; Miss.Code, 1930, sec. 4693; P. L. N. H., 1926, ch. 147, sec.9;
Comp. Stat. Neb., 1922, sees. 8155 to 8157; N. C. Code, 1927, sec. 6081; Cahill's
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tained. Cincinnati v. Steinkamp was an Ohio case in which it
was held, that the owner was not deprived of property without
due process of law, because of no trial by jury, where the statute
gave the court of equity power to enforce the provisions of the
statute, and to restrain the use of any building erected or main-
tained in violation thereof.64
The provisions of these statutes vary considerably. The most
frequent provision being simply that hotels over a certain num-
ber of stories in height (usually two) must provide fire escapes
made of rope, of specified thickness and of sufficient length to
reach the ground, in each room.65 These statutes, it is submit-
ted, are clearly insufficient to effect their purpose-protection of
the guest's life. A rope fire escape is of help only to an able-
bodied person. Most women, aged people, cripples, and very
young children, are not physically able to lower themselves to
the ground by such means, as the Buckingham Annex holocaust,
which occurred in St. Louis some five years ago, illustrated so
horribly. Only partial protection may be said to be afforded by
such statutes.
Only about a dozen states require that the fire escapes be con-
structed of iron or some other incombustible material.6 6 These
states, in the writer's opinion, provide adequate protection. Ex-
Consol. Laws N. Y., 1930, ch. 21, sec. 205; Page's Anno. Ohio Gen. Code,
1926, secs. 4658 to 4660; R. C. Ariz., 1928, sec. 408; Idaho Comp. Stat., 1919,
sees. 1797, 1798; La. Gen. Stat., 1932, secs. 3520 to 3533; R. S. Me., 1930, ch.
35, secs. 38, 39; N. J. Comp. Stat., 1910, "Fire and Police," secs. 25, 27;
Comp. Law N. D., 1913, sec. 2977; Comp. Law S. D., 1929, sec. 7833; Gen.
Law Vt., 1917, sec. 6327; Laws Vt., 1921, sec. 6327; Comp. Laws Utah, sec.
2951; Oregon Law, 1920, secs. 8250 to 8253; Pa. Stat., 1920, secs. 10913 to
10920; Gen. Laws R. I., 1923, sees. 2465, 2466; Code Tenn., 1932, secs. 5669 to
5672; Complete Tex. Stat., 1928, sec. 3956; Va. Code, 1924, sec. 1587; Rem.'s
Comp. Stat. Wash., 1922, sees. 6871, 6872; Wyo. Comp. Stats., 1920, secs.
3659 to 3664; Barne's W. Va. Code, 1923, ch. 15N, sec. 13; ch. 15S, sec. 1.
'4 (1896) 54 Ohio St. 284, 43 N. E. 490; see also, Miller v. Strahl (1915)
239 U. S. 426; and Adams v. Cumberland Inn Co. (1907) 117 Tenn. 470, 101
S. W. 428.
65 Dig. Stat. Ark., 1921, sec. 5562; Comp. Law Colo., 1921, sec. 5473; Ca-
hill's Ill. R. S., 1929, ch. 71, par. 10; Burn's Anno. Ind. Stat., 1926, sec. 4422;
R. S. Kan., 1923, sees. 36-107; Miss. Code, 1930, sec. 4693; P. L. N. H., 1926,
ch. 147, sec. 9; Cahill's Consol. Laws N. Y., 1930, ch. 21, sec. 205; Ohio Gen.
Code, 1926, sec. 4658; Idaho Comp. Stat., 1919, sec. 1798; La. Gen. Stat., 1932,
sec. 3820; N. J. Comp. Stat., 1910, "Fire and Police," sec. 25; Comp. Laws
N. D., 1913, sec. 2977; Comp. Laws S. D., 1929, sec. 7833; Code Tenn., 1932,
sec. 5269.
66 Comp. Law Colo., 1921, sec. 5474; Gen. Stat. Conn., 1930, secs. 2613,
2614; Comp. Gen. Laws Fla., 1927, sec. 3370; Carroll's Ky. Stat., 1930, sec.
2095a; R. S. Mont., 1921, sec. 2780; Comp. Stat. Neb., 1922, sec. 8155; Gen.
Stat. Minn., 1923, sees. 5897, 5910; Comp. Laws Utah, sec. 2951; Ore. Laws,
1920, sec. 8250; Code Tenn., 1932, sec. 5669; Complete Tex. Stat., 1928, sec.
3856; Rem.'s Comp. Stat. Wash., 1922, sec. 6871; Wyo. Comp. Stat., 1920,
sec. 3659; Barne's W. Va. Code, 1923, ch. 15S, sec. 1.
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cept that a few states, such as Missouri, 7 Colorado, Kentucky, and
Minnesota, only require rope fire escapes on hotels of less than
three stories, iron fire escapes of the stairway variety being re-
quired for hotels over three stories in height. The difference in
height of the building, while perhaps it may be justified as a
reason for the different requirements on some basis, such as
probable differences in the financial abilities of a small hotel to
meet the extra expense involved in erecting and maintaining iron
fire escapes, is unjustifiable if we keep in mind that the primary
purpose of these statutes is the protection of human life.
Many of the states make provision for fire extinguishers and
sprinklers. 8 And many require that the hallways of the hotels
be constructed in a certain way, so as to provide ready means of
egress for the guests, and that all ways of ingress and egress be
kept free and unobstructed.69 Some states provide that the hotel
must have such fire escapes as the fire marshal, or other desig-
nated state or local officer, may direct.70 These statutes, while
providing flexibility for their enforcement, which is sometimes
desirable, make it possible that adequate protection will not be
had at all, because of the possibility of bribery, which is apparent
to anyone who has observed the workings of city politics. The
writer personally knows of two instances in which tenement
houses in St. Louis were not properly equipped with fire escapes
because the owners "knew somebody." Of course, the answer
to this objection may be found in the old saying, that abuse is no
argument against proper use. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
it is more desirable to make abuse impossible, so far as may be
done. To this end, the more rigid requirement of simply demand-
ing an iron stairway fire escape is more desirable. Especially
in view of some decisions, which hold, that, where the duty to
provide fire escapes is entirely dependent upon a fire marshal's
order, no recovery may be had where a guest is injured by fire in
a hotel not equipped with fire escapes, the fire marshal not having
ordered fire escapes to be provided.70
67 R. S. Mo., 1929, secs. 13096, 13097; see also, sec. 13757.18 Comp. Gen. Laws Fla., 1927, sec. 3370; Cahill's Ill. R. S., 1929, ch. 71;
R. S. Kans., 1923, secs. 36-107; R. C. Mont., 1921, sec. 2779; Comp. Stat. Neb.,
1922, sec. 8157; Idaho Comp. Stat., 1919, sec. 1800; Pa. Stat., 1921, sec. 10914;
Va. Code, 1924, sec. 1587; Rem.'s Comp. Stat. Wash., 1922, sec. 6871.
,9 Carroll's Ky. Stat., 1930, sec. 2095a; R. C. Mont., 1921, sec. 2780; R. S.
Mo., 1929, sec. 13096; Comp. Stat. Neb., 1922, ch. 147, sec. 9; N. C. Code, 1927,
see. 6081; Ohio. Gen. Code, 1926, sec. 4659; Pa. Stat., 1920, sec. 10914; Ore.
Laws, 1920, see. 8250; Rem.'s Comp. Stat. Wash., 1922, sec. 6871; Barne's
W. Va. Code, ch. 15N, sec. 13.
70 R. C. Ariz., 1928, sec. 408; R. S. Me., 1930, ch. 38, sec. 39; N. J. Comp.
Stat., 1910, "Fire and Police," sec. 27; N. Mex. Stats., 1929, secs. 90-402;
Gen. Law Vt., 1921, sec. 6327.7oa De Ginther v. N. J. Home (1896) 58 N. J. L. 354, 33 Atl. 968; Perry v.
Bangs (1894) 161 Mass. 35, 36 N. E. 683.
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Where the death or injury of a guest is caused by fire in a hotel
not properly equipped with fire escapes and other means of pro-
tection, the innkeeper is held liable in damages for such death or
injury in many states. However, the means by which such a re-
sult is obtained differs. In a half dozen states the question is
settled by statutes which provide for civil as well as criminal lia-
bility.7 1 But the great majority of the states provide for only
criminal liability, that is, they provide that the innkeeper shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor for every violation (usually it is pro-
vided that for each day that passes while the statute is being
violated, there shall be a separate offense), subjecting him most
frequently to a fine of varying amounts.72 Nevertheless, civil lia-
bility may be imposed in those states, on the ground that the
statute requiring fire escapes was for the benefit of the injured
guest. As a general principle it may be stated, that every per-
son who violates a statute is a wrongdoer, and, as such, ex necessi-
tate, negligent in the eye of the law; and that every innocent party
who is injured by the act constituting a violation of the statute is
entitled to a civil remedy for such injury, notwithstanding any
redress the public may also have. 73 This principle has frequently
been enunciated in cases involving railroads.74 In cases involv-
ing injuries or deaths caused by hotel fires, where the hotel was
not properly equipped with fire escapes or other means of pro-
tection required by statute, recovery by the person injured or
the representative of his estate has frequently been allowed, on
the principle above stated, that the statute was for the benefit
of the injured guest.75 In the Nebraska case of Hoopes v.
Creighton,76 it was said, that the violation of any statutory or
valid municipal regulation, established for the purpose of pro-
tecting persons or property from injury, is sufficient to prove
such a breach of duty as will sustain a private action for negli-
7' See statutes of Conn., Ill., Ind., Ohio, La., N. J., and Pa., cited supra,
note 63.
72 See statutes of Ala., Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ky., Kan., Mich., Minn.,
Mont., Miss., N. H., Neb., N. C., N. Y., Ariz., Idaho, Me., N. D., S. D., Vt.,
Utah, Ore., R. I., Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash., Wyo., W. Va.; all cited supra,
note 63.
73 Jetter v. N. Y. & H. R. Co. (1865) 2 Keyes 154; Pitcher v. Lennon (1896)
12 App. Div. 356, 42 N. Y. S. 156.
7' See 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339, note, and cases cited.
75 Hoopes v. Creighton (1916) 100 Neb. 510, 160 N. W. 742; Strahl v. Miller(1915) 97 Neb. 820; aff. (1915) 239 U. S. 420; Rose v. King (1892) 49 Ohio
St. 213, 30 N. E. 267; Friedman v. Shindler's Prairie House (1928) 224 App.
Div. 232, 230 N. Y. S. 44; Love v. New Fairview Hotel, 10 B. C. 330; Land-
graf v. Kuh (1901) 188 II. 484, 59 N. E. 501; Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan(1918) 180 Ky. 609, 203 S. W. 555; Yall v. Snow, note 62, above; Willey v.
Mulledy (1879) 78 N. Y. 314; Johnson v. Snow (1907) 201 Mo. 450, 100
S. W. 5.
76 Note 75, above.
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gence, if the other elements of actionable negligence concur; that
a hotel owner may not omit to do those things which are reason-
ably necessary for the safety and protection of the guests of the
house, and if he disregards the provisions of the law concerning
the establishment of fire escapes upon the building, and such other
devices as the law provides for, he will be held liable for the dam-
ages sustained because of the death of any guest which may be
brought about by his negligence; and that the fact that the statute
does not in terms impose a civil liability for its violation does not
affect such evidence of its violation as may go to show negligence.
And in an Ohio case, Rose v. King, the court said:
"Such liability followed as a consequence of the terms of the
original act . . . which enjoined the duty, and resulted
from the principle, which we have supposed to be of universal
application, that where a statute imposes a duty but gives no
penalty to the party aggrieved by its nonperformance, that
party is entitled, on common law principles, to maintain an
action for his damages." 77
(The statutes providing for fire escapes frequently extend to
some buildings besides hotels; for a proper exposition of the law
it has been necessary in note 73, and in the cases cited as in ac-
cord in note 77 to cite cases relating to factories and tenements
as well as to hotels.)
But it has been held, that such statutes do not necessarily give
a right of action to individuals injured as a result of a failure to
comply with their requirements. In Grant v. Slater Mill and
Power Co., a Rhode Island case, a statute required every building
in which operatives were employed in any of the stories above
the second to be provided with proper and sufficient fire escapes;
and provided that any person violating any of the provisions of
the act should be fined, and that the supreme court might restrain
by injunction any violation of the act. It was held, that the
statute did not give a right of action to an individual who, while
working as an operative in such building, is compelled to jump
from an upper window, and is injured; since the purpose of the
act was to secure safe structures as a police measure and for the
general safety, and not to create any duty which can be made
the subject of any action by an individual. The court said, that
were it not for the provision that the supreme court could enforce
the act by injunction, the remedy by an action by individuals in-
77 Note 75, above. See also Wardwell v. Cameron (1914) 126 Minn. 149,
148 N. W. 110. Accord: Mullins v. Nordlaw (1916) 170 Ky. 169, 185 S. W.
825; Amberg v. Kinley (1915) 214 N. Y. 531, 108 N. E. 830; Story v. Cowen
(1912) 170 Ill. App. 902; Steiert v. Soulter (1913) 54 Ind. App. 643, 102
N. E. 113.
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jured would not be excluded, but that this remedy by suit in equity
was not purely a public remedy, and that, since in addition to the
purely public remedy, another not purely public was provided,
it must be presumed that these two were intended to be the only
remedies.78 This was the only case found denying recovery to
the injured person or his representative. The trend is distinctly
to allow recovery, if the other elements necessary to attach -lia-
bility, such as proximate cause, are present.
But the failure to construct fire escapes as required by statute
or ordinance, does not make the proprietor liable for the death or
injury of a guest by fire, unless the death was caused by the lack
of fire escapes.7 9 That is, the lack of fire escapes must have been
the proximate cause of the death. So, where the guest could not
have reached a fire escape or used an extinguisher had one been
provided, recovery was denied, on the ground that the failure to
provide fire escapes or extinguishers was not the proximate cause
of the death80 Whether the failure to provide fire escapes was
the proximate cause of the death is a question for the jury.S1 The
question of proximate cause is discussed in all the cases cited in
the footnotes which involve a suit against an innkeeper occasioned
by an injury to or death of a guest caused by fire in the hotel.
Throughout the cases runs the statement, that an innkeeper is
not an insurer of the safety of his guest. "Yet he may not omit
to do the things that are reasonably necessary for his safety and
protection." 8 2 He is only required to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.8 3 What is reasonable care under the
circumstances is, of course, a jury question.8 4 It has been held,
however, that the mere accumulation in the basement of a hotel
of such boxes and rubbish as would ordinarily accumulate in such
places is not evidence of negligence on the part of the innkeeper,
which will charge him with liability for an injury to a guest who
attempted to escape when such boxes and rubbish took fire and
filled the building with smoke.8 5 And there is no presumption of
78 (1884) 14 R. I. 380.
T9 Weeks v. McNulty (1898) 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809; Louisville Trust
Co. v. Morgan, note 75, above; Strahl v. Miller, note 75, above; Pertle's Adm'x
v. Hargis Bank & Trust Co. (1932) 241 Ky. 455, 44 S. W. (2d) 541; West v.
Spratling (1920) 204 Ala. 478, 86 So. 32.
80 Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, note 75, above.
81 Adams v. Cumberland Inn Co., note 64, above.
82 Strahl v. Miller, note 75, above.
83 Strahl v. Miller, note 75, above; Weeks v. McNulty, note 79, above; Bell
v. Daugherty (1924) 199 Iowa 412, 200 N. W. 708; Stewart v. Weiner (1924)
108 Neb. 49, 198 S. W. 159; Ritchey v. Cassone (1929) 296 Pa. 249, 145 Atl.
822; Parker v. Kirkwood (1932) 134 Kan. 749, 8 Pac. (2d) 341.
84 See cases cited, notes 79 to 83, inclusive.
85 Bell v. Daugherty, note 83, above.
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negligence arising from the fact that a fire breaks out in the inn. 0
But an innkeeper is not acquitted of a charge of common law
negligence by proof of his compliance with a statute. The statu-
tory requirements are held to fix only the minimum below which
negligence per se arises.87 What due care requires in excess of
the statutory duty is a question of fact for the jury.88 It has been
held, that due care requires the innkeeper to warn his guests of
the fire; or perhaps, it should be said, in the words of the case,
that he has "the duty" to warn his guests.8 9 This seems to be
the rule in this country. However, a British case refused to place
this duty upon the innkeeper. 90 There it was held, on demurrer,
that an innkeeper is not responsible for neglecting to warn his
guest of the breaking out of a fire in the hotel, so as to enable him
to escape, and, therefore, that the innkeeper is not liable for the
death of the guest resulting from such fire. The fire there ap-
peared to have been accidental, and the death of the guest result-
ing therefrom seems to have been regarded as of the same nature.
However, the court said:
"We ought to be very careful in creating a new liability, and
we think this declaration attempts so to do. Even if the duty
of the innkeeper were as extensive as the plaintiff seeks to
put it, it would be quite consistent with the pleading, that
the defendant had reason to believe that the fire would not
reach that part of the building where Hare was, and was
engaged all the time in trying to extinguish it, believing that
he could succeed in so doing. Any pleading seeking to fasten
such a liability on a mere nonfeasance ought to show beyond
a reasonable doubt a clear neglect of some legal duty."
The American rule imposing the duty upon the innkeeper seems
clearly preferable. The guest should be given every opportunity
to save himself from injury. In a building the size of the aver-
age hotel, a guest may not discover the presence of the danger
until it is too late to save himself from it, unless he is warned of
it in time.
Fire may be caused by a structural defect in the hotel. The
only American case found on the point, one which was decided in
California by the Supreme Court of that State, held, that an inn-
88 Burt v. Nichols (1915) 264 Mo. 1, 173 S. W. 681; Mitchell v. Hotel Berry
(1929) 34 Ohio App. 259, 171 N. E. 39; Weeks v. McNulty, note 79, above;
Ritchey v. Cassone, note 83, above.
87 Mitchell v. Hotel Berry, note 86, above.
88 Mitchell v. Hotel Berry, note 86, above.
89 West v. Spratling, note 79, above; Mitchell v. Hotel Berry, note 86, above;
Parker v. Kirkwood, note 83, above.
90 Hare v. Henderson (1878) 43 U. C. Q. B. 571.
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keeper was not liable to a guest's guest for an injury which was
due to a structural defect in the hotel. 91 As the California court
holds that an innkeeper owes the guest's guest the same degree
of care as the guest, the fact that a guest was not suing is imma-
terial for our present purpose. This is an unsatisfactory rule.
The innkeeper's duty to provide safe premises for the guest should
include his duty to provide premises that are structuarally se-
cure. For, with an exceptional instance here and there, a guest
cannot possibly know of a structural insecurity of an hotel build-
ing. He should not be made to assume the risk of structural in-
security, as the California decision makes him do. England has
a far more satisfactory rule. There, the innkeeper's duty to
protect his guest includes an implied warranty on his part that
the premises are safe. This may make him liable for the negli-
gence of an independent contractor. In Maclenan v. Segar,92
the plaintiff was injured while trying to escape from a fire caused
by defects in the arrangement of a flue, designed by an architect
and installed by a building contractor, for the purpose of convey-
ing smoke from the kitchen in the defendant's hotel. The court
held, that the contract between the defendant and the plaintiff
carried with it an implied warranty that the premises were as
safe as reasonable skill and security could make them. It said:
"Where the occupier of premises agrees for a reward that
a person shall have the right to enter and use them for a
mutually contemplated purpose, the contract between them-
unless there is an express provision otherwise-contains an
implied warranty that the premises are as safe for that pur-
pose as reasonable care and skill on the part of anyone can
make them. The rule is subject to the limitation, that the
defendant is not to be held responsible for defects which could
not have been discovered by reasonable care or skill on the
part of any person concerned with the construction, alter-
ation, repair, or maintenance of the premises."
Whether the remaining American courts will apply this salutary
rule, or will follow the California rule, remains to be seen. At
all events, the case is of particular interest at the present time
because of the amebic dysentery epidemic, which, as was ex-
plained in the introduction, was caused, at least in part, by faulty
plumbing in two Chicago hotels.
When a guest is injured by fire, the injury being caused by
lack of proper fire escapes or other equipment required by statute,
91 Goldstein v. Healy (1921) 187 Cal. 206, 201 Pac. 462; Borgnis v. Cal.-
Ore. Power Co. (Cal. 1927) 258 Pac. 394.
92 (1917) 2 K. B. 325.
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it frequently happens that it is not desirable to bring an action
against the innkeeper. In a frequently cited case, YaU v. Snow,93
it was held, that the Missouri statute applied to the owner of the
building as well as to the lessee. Accordingly, the defendant
owner was held liable for an injury caused by the lack of fire es-
capes, even though the building was not constructed to be used
as a hotel. No general rule in this respect, however, can be
formulated. Whether the duty of erecting and maintaining fire
escapes rests upon the owner of the building or on the tenant, or
on both, depends upon the language of the statute creating the
duty.94
There are some instances in which a guest who is injured by
fire or because of some other case cannot recover from the inn-
keeper for such injury. Where the plaintiff is injured in mak-
ing improper use of a fire escape by going out upon it when there
was no necessity for its use, it has been held, that there could be
no recovery, since no duty is owed by the owner of the building to
keep the escape safe for other than fire purposes.9 There also
may be a waiver of the statutory requirement. Where a person
occupied a room in a hotel as a guest for six months, knowing that
there was no rope or other appliance in the room, to be used in
case of fire, and made no complaint, it was held, that she could
not recover against the owner because of his failure to supply a
rope, as was required by statute.96 A guest has been held to be
contributorily negligent when, with knowledge of the defective
construction, he remained a guest at the hotel.97 But the trend
of the cases reported is, that the fact that the guest knew of the
condition of the building does not relieve the innkeeper of liability
(or the owner of the building),98 even where the guest occupied
the room for six months.99 This on the ground that the statutory
duty was absolute, and that the statute was intended for the bene-
93 Note 62, above. Accord: Carrigan v. Stillwell (1903) 97 Me. 247, 54
Atl. 389; Johnson v. Snow, note 75, above; Landgraf v. Kuh, note 75, above;
Adams v. Cumberland Inn Co., note 64, above; Courtant v. Snow (1006) 201
Mo. 527, 100 S. W. 5; McLaughlin v. Armfield (1890) 58 Hun. 376. Contra:
Lee v. Smith (1885) 42 Ohio St. 458; West v. Inman (1912) 137 Ga. 822, 74
S. E. 527.
94 See statutes cited, note 63, above.
95 McAlpin v. Powell, note 31, above; Landers v. Brooks (Mass. 1926) 154
N. E. 265.96 Armaindo v. Ferguson (1890) 37 App. Div. 160, 55 N. Y. S. 769; Radley
v. Knepfly (1911) 104 Tex. 130, 135 S. W. 111.
97 Glass v. Coleman (1896) 14 Wash. 635, 45 Pac. 310.9 8 Hoopes v. Creighton, note 75, above; Love v. New Fairview Corp., note
75, above; Cittadino v. Shackter (1912) 83 N. J. L. 593, 85 Atl. 174; Willey v.
Mulledy, note 75, above; Adams v. Cumberland Inn Co., note 64, above; Burt
v. Nichols, note 86, above.
99 Adams v. Cumberland Inn Co., note 64, above.
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fit of the guest. This is clearly the preferable view. If the inn-
keeper is allowed to excuse himself by saying that the guest had
knowledge of the fact that the inn was not properly equipped with
fire escapes or other devices for protection against fire, the effect
is to allow him to subvert the intent of the statute, which, after all,
was to protect the lives of the guests.
As this survey has shown, the innkeeper's duty to protect the
person of his guest varies in the different jurisdictions of this
country. Sometimes the variance between the holdings is con-
siderable, as the two Clancy v. Barker cases illustrate. Lack of
uniformity seems to be particularly undesirable in this field of
the law, concerned as it is largely with our great transient popula-
tion, which moves freely back and forth across state boundaries.
The traveller should be able to know to what extent he may rely
upon the innkeeper to protect him from injury. This is par-
ticularly true in regard to the sanitary condition of the inn and
protection from fire. As has been indicated in the preceding dis-
cussion, the fire protection which is required by many states is
exceedingly inadequate. Fire escapes constructed of iron or
some other incombustible material should be the universal re-
quirement for all hotels not of fireproof construction which have
guest rooms above the ground floor. A uniform fire escape law
would be highly desirable. Such a law should embody the fire
protection requirements found in the more advanced states (that
is, in states whose law on this subject is more advanced), such as
Connecticut; and statutory provision should be made for civil
liability for injuries resulting from failure to comply with the
fire protection statutes, again following the Connecticut example
(the Connecticut statute-Gen. Stat. 1930, sec. 2616-not only
provides for civil liability, but goes on to provide that the guest's
knowledge of the improper condition of the inn is no defense to
an action for damages for injuries caused by the lack of the equip-
ment required by statute).
In view of the added emphasis placed upon human values today,
as is reflected by the "New Deal" in its broad field, the time seems
ripe for bringing the country's ninth greatest industry to a fuller
realization of the burden it should bear in protecting the life and
limb of him who is its sole cause for existence, its guest.
EDWARD LOUIS EYERMAN, '34.
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